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by ManaY  Schrenk
INTRODUCTION
Past analyses  of the economies  of the socialist member countries  tended to downplay  trade and
payment relations through the  Council for Mutual  Economic  Assistance  (CMEA, sometimes  referred
to as COMECON).  The key analytical concern was with Western external debt, borrowing
requirements, and creditwo[thiness  in Convertible  Currencies  (CCs); in that context relations within
the CMEA were peripheral.  Moreover, the paradigm of multilateral  trade and currency convertibility
was not suited for analysis  of CMEA's system of trade and payments
This paper describes  the CMEA system of trade and payment, (the "CMEA  regime') and
considers how the transition from traditional  socialism  to a market economy is linked to changes  of
the mechanism  for international  transactions. Section 1 summarizes  the CMEA's history,
organizational  structure, institutional  principles, and reform efforts.  Section 2 provides a brief
statistical  overview of the relative importance  of the CMEA  trade for its rmembers. Section 3 sets out
the traditional "institutional  model" of the CMEA regime.  Section  4 discusses  its defects. Section 5
presents a summary evaluation  of the CMEA regime.  Section  6 turns to the events surrounding  the
CMEA's demise during 1990. The final section presents a number of conjectures  as to the
consequences  of that demise. Due to the dearth of hard evidence  and statistical  data - and the high
degree of uncertainty  of the implicit  political assumptions  - many conclusions  of the final section are
conjectural.
I. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION  OF THE CMEA AND INITIATIVES  FOR REFORM
The CMEA was founded in 1949. Its European  members were the USSR plus Poland, GDR,
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria ("the Six").  Mongolia,  Cuba, and Vietnam  were
non-European  members. Albania was a member but left after its break with the USSR.  Yugoslavia
was an associate member.
The highest body of the CMEA was the Council Session, the regular annual meeting  of heads of
governments. Its permanent  board was the Executive  Committee  of government  representatives;  a
number of Council Committees  and Standing  Commissions  met regularly on specific matters of
sectoral planning and coordination. The core organization  was the CMEA Secretariat. The CMEA
created two special financial  institutions,  the International  Bank for Economic  Cooperation  (IBEC)
and the International  Investment  Bank (IIB), both located  in Moscow, the CMEA's headquarters.
IBEC managed the complex  clearing  between members' accounts  and short-term  credits; accounts
were held and settled bilaterally  in "transferable  rubles" (171R),  the common  currency for CMEA  trade
and payment  transactions. IIB's main activity was financing  joint projects; it also undertook  external
borrowing in convertible  currencies for joint projects and financed investment  projects in developing
countries (mostly in the non-European  CMEA members  and on a small scale).  By end of 1987, IIB
was reported to have committed  a total of TRIO billion ($16 billion at the -- meaningless  - official
exchange  rate) to 87 projects; 70 percent of all commraitments  were for the energy sector. While IIB
participated in joint projects, not all such projects relied on IIB financing. IIB loans typically  had a
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maturity  of between 5 and 15 years at interest rates between 3 and 5 percent, with reportedly lower
rates for "priority projects" and for lending to LDCs.
The political principle  of the CMEA was "equality,  sovereignty,  and interest." Unanimity  was
required on all decisions  of common concern. The organs of the CMEA had no supranational
executive  or legislative  mandate. Common  decisions  of members  were merely declarations  of intent
and were not legally binding  unless translated  into (mostly  bilateral)  treaties. The unliinited  veto
power the principle  gave to every member was circumscribed  merely by the "principle  of
interestedness,"  which excluded  veto rights of countries  not directly  affected  by the particular  matter.
Nevertheless,  the lack of supranationality  in procedures  tended p..sistently to reduce the outcome of
initiatives  to the lowest common  denominator;  a case in point was the failure of the Soviet  initiative
during the Khrushchev  era to institute  an integrated  CMEA-wide  planning  system.
During the four decades after inception,  the CMEA  developed  an elaborate institutional
framework  for planning and implementing  bilateral trade between  members, denominated  in TR.3
This did not create a 'common market" with supranational  institutions  and a common external  trade
policy. However, the CMEA evolved into a distinct "economic  region' in terms of preferential
relationships  among  members codified in bilateral  treaties.  Agreements  on production  specialization
were often an integral  part of trade relations. Tle framework  of the CMEA regime was an outgrowth
of central planning, and its rules and procedures  differed fundamentally  from those of the convertible
currency trade reg-...i  of the member  countries.
II. IMPORTANCE  AND PATTERN  OF CMEA TRADE
Data on intra-CMEA  trade are notoriously  deficient  and merely indicate  orders of magnitude.-Y
Table 1 gives an overview  of the structure of global CMEA trade.
The figures demonstrate  the weight of intraregional  trade for members in 1985. According  to
these data, 56 percent of total CMEA  exports were internal to the region; for the USSR intraregional
trade accounted  for about one-half  the total, and for the Six (in the aggregate  and on average) for
about 60 percent.
Table 1.  Structure of Exports by Trade Areas
(1985; US$ billion)
Area  ArenlCounty of Destination
Countq  of Orl'ga  OECD  LDCs  Yug.  Chtna  USSR  Six  CMEA  WORLD
OECD  909.4  269.2  6.0  27.0  20.6  15.2  (38.5)  1,247.4
LDCs  ex. Y&C  304.2  142.9  1.9  7.6  10.5  6.8  (17.3)  473.9
Yugoslavia  3.5  1.7  n.a.  0.1  3.4  1.S  (5.2)  10.7
China  11.4  13.9  0  n.a.  1.1  1.0  (2-1)  27.3
USSR  21.3  15.7  0.2  0.9  n.a.  40.8  (40.8)  78.9
Six  20.4  9.5  1.5  1.5  32.9  17.9  50.8  83.7
CMEA  (41.7)  (25.2)  (1.7)  (2.4)  (32.9)  (58.7)  (91.6)  (162.6)
WORLD  1270.2  452.9  9.6  37.1  68.4  83.5  (151.9)  1,921.7
Souroce:  United Nations.The importance of members'  intraregional trade and trade with the USSR in 1989 is highlighted
in Table 2.
Table  2.  Shares  of the CMEA  in Exports  of Member  Countries;
Shars  of the USSR In Exports  of Menber  Countries
(1989 - percentage of total exports)
CMEA  I  TFAL  UW9S  /  CM  USSR  I  TMAL
X  M  x  M  X  M
Bulgatia  83  73  79  74  66  54
CSSR  54  55  57  54  31  30
ODR  42  38  57  58  24  22
Hungary  39  39  62  56  24  22
Poland  35  32  60  56  21  18
Romania  40  55  58  59  23  32
USSR  46  50
Source: Van Brabant  (1990).
CMEA trade relations were thus predominantly bilateral  relations between each of the Six and the
USSR.
CMEA trade  exhibited a distinct pattern of commodity specialization.  Tle  USSR primarily sup-
plied raw materials,  including a high share of primary energy,  mainly in exchange for manufactures.
Hungarian data, which are representative for the Six, illustrate the commodity pattern reflected in
Table 3, consisting of USSR exports of primarily  "hard goods" in worldwide demand in exchange for
"soft goods" with only a limited, if any,  market outside the CMEA.
Table  3.  Hungary:  Commodity  Composition,  Ruble  and  Non-Ruble
(1987 - in percentage)A'
Exports  Imports
Ruble  Non-Ruble  Ruble  Non-Ruble
Enay  0.8  8.1  31.6  11.3
Other  Raw Materials  1.9  8.6  12.7  13.3
Semifinished  Goods  10.5  25.9  12.9  30.7
Maciney  including  Spam  56.5  15.7  29.6  23.4
Other Manufacture  17.2  13.2  10.5  10.3
Agriculture  and Food  products  13.1  28.6  2.7  11.1
Source:  Central Statistical Offie.4
This commodity  pattem established  dependency  among  members. The pattern of specialization,
however, indicates  that the degree of dependency  was quite different for the Six than for the USSR:
supply-side  constraints  to trade diversion  on the part of the Six were inherent in their export mix,
wul'e the USSR could, in principle, shift trade to non-CMEA  countries  witho-  t rnajor economic
disruptions.
111.  THE "INSTlTUTIONAL  MODEL" OF THE CMEA REGIME
To establish  a systemic context for selective  discussion  of problems (Section  4), this paper now turns
to the traditional  CMEA regime as an institutional  model and identifies  the main "actors," principal
"rules," and the connection  between these "building  blocks."Y'  This "idealized"  presentation  will be
subsequently  refined.  The model is a simplified  image of a more complex reality. During the 1980s,
the differences between  the model and reality, and also among  countries, wideried  progressively,
although  often more in pronouncement  than in fact.
Desiderata  of Inteeration.  "Socialist  integration"  and "socialist  division  of labor" were frequently
cited objectives  of the CMEA. The doctrine  of static comparative  advantage  was rarely invoked.
The principal  economic  advantages  of integration  via the CMEA were rather seen in economies  of
scale realized  by "cooperation"  and "specialization." There could also be capital cost savings from
predictable  output levels and composition,  concentration  of research and development  through coordi-
nated programs with free exchange  of results.  Independence  from exogenous  cyclical disturbances
and 'security of supply" in the face of real or imagined  politica' disruption  of international  trade were
also major goals, supporting  a tendency  toward regional autrky.
LnibstialCoop_er_ation.  Cooperation  mostly took the form of horizontal  specialization  agreements  on
specific  final products that gave the country  of specialization  a virtual monopoly. Vertical specializa-
tion involving  complex cross-country  supply networks  for parts and components  is more difficult  to
organize though intergovernment  agreements  and was accordingly  rare; supply of raw materials  from
the USSR to the Six was, however, a major exception. Cooperation  agreements  were mostly  bilateral
and long-term.
Trade Planning. CMEA trade was planned  through consultations  called "plan coordination,"  an
integr.al  part of the national  five-year planning  exercises. The consultations  focused on an exchange
of information  about national  requirements  or availability  of tradables  derived from national  balances
of supply and requirements. While participation  in plan coordination  was mandatory, the extent and
contents  of agreed exchange were voluntary. lhe  agreements  were given more specific content in
bilateral, medium-term  government  protocols  that set the volume and composition  of trade; these
agreements  often included  or were based on production  cooperation. Over the planning cycle, the
medium-tenn  protocols  were respecified  further in annual protocols. The planned  trade balances  were
broken down into a number of subcategories  to be balanced  separately. Since frequently  both
quantities  and value balances  were determined  (either in absolute  terms or as relative changes  over the
past), trade planning often set implicit transaction  prices.
ntity  Bias.  The origin of CMEA trade planning in traditional  central planning  through material
balances, where trade is the "closing"  item, and the practice of breaking  the total down into specific
subbalances  gave the targets of bilateral protocols  a distinct quantity  bias.  Even if the ex ante
balances were expressed in value terms for purposes  of monitoring  or statistical  aggregation,
understandings  on composition,  or on quantity  and price indices, tended to turn the value targets into5
physical indicators as well. The quantity  bias, however, did not imply that CMEA trade was 'barter
trade.  "V
gad/S.Qft  The CMEA  trade planning  procedures  and the nature of the delivery commitments
gave rise to a distinction  between "soft" good. (uncompetitive  at world markets and tradable  only
within the region and as part of the bilateral quota regimes) and "hard" goods (fully  tradable at the
competitive  world market).7' It was to the advantage  of each country  to maximize CMEA imports of
hard goods in exchange for CMEA exports of soft goods in order to conserve convertible  currency;
this pattern of preferei.e  ;e av referred to as "structural  bilateralism." Incompatible  country positions
complicated  the problems  of seting and balancing  subcategories  in CMEA trade.
Impgrge Inputs.  Many manufactured  goods incorporated  inputs of raw materials intermediate  goods
and components  imported from the CMEA and the West.  If a country's average content  of imported
hard inputs of its exports to the CMEA exceeded  that of its CMEA  trading partner, and if the foreign
exchange  cost or benefit per unit of domestic currency  differed between  the two regimes, separate
accounting  and balancing  became  necessary  for the implicit deficit country  to contain this leakage.
Trade Management. In the traditional  CMEA regime, trade was managed  by a few large roreign
Trade Organizations  (FTOs) that operated under direct supervision  of the ministry in charge of
international  economic  relations; the FTOs had a trading monopoly  for a wide range of products.
This concentration  ensured that delivery contracts  were concluded  and that deliveries were made in
accordance  with the govermnents'  trade protocols. Central control  over maintenance  of agreed
delivery balances  was also thereby facilitated,  and the real economy  was isolated from effects of
currency transactions.
Delivery  Priorities.  CMEA trade was based on international  treaties, so if current demand could not
be met, CMEA export had, at least in principle, the highest priority in the central allocation  of
output.  Conversely,  eeliveries to convertible  currency  markets were, at least in principle, a residual
after satisfying  treaty obligations  and domestic  requirements. Countries  were also legally bound to
absorb agreed-upon  CMEA imports, and to place the burden of adjustment  on domestic deliveries  and
CC imports  in thK  case of an unplanned  glut.F
Quotas. Because  of bilateral treaty commitments,  the need to maintain  distinct subbalances,  and the
lack of convertibility,  an elaborate regime of import and export monitoring and control was required.
Ex-ante and ex-post flows could only be matched  through mandatory quotas, although  not necessarily
described as such.  Quotas  could take the form of ceilings and/or floors on  exports or imports and
were often enterprise-specific  for each country  (see Inotai 1986). Ad hoc quota adjustments  were
required to manage emerging  imbalances.
Pri.  The CMEA tried but failed to develop its own set of regional relative prices based on the
labor theory of value.  In fact, each country  had its own set of relative prices, reflecting  domestic
distributional  and political priorities, that deviated  from relative prices in both the competitive  world
market and in other CMEA countries. Prices for CMEA trade were established  with reference  to
world market prices.  Moving five-year averages, converted into TR (the so-called "Bucharest
principle') served as the basis for negotiations  on  determination  of regional transaction  prices.  Since
these negotiations  were strictly two-way  and aimed at bilateral balancing,  the same good could be
traded at different pdices  between  different pairs of countries; hence CMEA prices constituted
sensitive information.6
Pfflf E"  aL7gio.  Since each CMEA country's internal  relative prices were unrelated to domestic
supply/demand wonditions,  comparative  advantage,  or opportunity  cost, domestic prices differed from
both CMEA transaction  and actual world market prices. Because  of the inconsistencies,  domestic  and
irading prices interfaced  in the accounts  of the few large FrOs  that were mandatory intermediaries  in
CMEA trade, rather than affecting  the transactions  of domestic export-producing  and import-receiving
enterprises. Domestic  enterprises  dealt with the FrOs exclusively  in domestic prices in domestic
currency and therefore were completely  isolated from external  transaction  prices.  The "windfall
profits' and "losses' created in the accounts  of FTOs by inconsistent  sets of relative prices were thus
neutralized  in an administratively  manageable  way through the institution  of "price equalization." 2'
The balance  of price equalization  was ultimately  settled through the government budget. 'The  size and
sign of the budgetary  impact could under certain conditions  be adjusted  by changes  in internal  prices,
and/or by changes  of exchange  rates.@ Price equalization  was not a trade management  instrument
nor was there a fiscal revenue function. It was rather an internal  settlement  mechanism  to maintain
orderly financial relations in spite of the autonomous  pricing practices  of the CMEA countries that
resulted in widely differing sets of relative  prices unrelated  to comparative  advantage. "Taxes" and
"subsidies"  used with reference to price equalization  may be convenient  shorthand terms but can be
misleading  if used without  qualification  of the context. These were not the taxes and subsidies  of the
Wastern neoclassical  international  trade literature.
The  Payment System and Convertibility. The CMEA  system of bilateral clearing did not involve
intemnational  payments through transfer of currency to or from accounts in another  country.  The TR
lacked  two major properties  of "money": it was neither a means  of payment nor a store of value
(Ausch 1969 and 1972). The total of TR in the CMEA  system was merely a measure of the
ousanding  bilateral surplus or deficit in national  clearing accounts  held by the countries  with IBEC.
A corollary of bilateral balancing  and settlement  through clearing  is that the system functions  without
a need for currency reserves. By the same token, the system lacks financial convertibility. Preagreed
commodity  balances and domestic allocation  regimes rule out the possibility  of using a surplus in
clearing balances  to "shop around" for procurement  opportunities  in the country with a debit in the
clearing accounts  - hence the "commodity  inconvertibility"  of the TR.  This undermined  a third
function  of money, that of an unambiguous  measure  of value.  Surpluses  in bilateral balances could be
freely used in the deficit country  only if bilateral understandings  existed to this effect, which required
a specific  designation  of commodities  and a quantitative  ceiling for qualifying  transactions. Of
course, the lack of bilateral financial  and commodity  convertibility  implied  the absence of any
financial  multilateralism.
i  Bilateral clearing of matching  value balances, and the absence  of money properties of the
common  currency, also ruled out "commercial"  trade credits as a normal ingredient  of foreign  trade.
Due to currency and commodity  inconvertibility,  imbalances  became "involuntary  trade credits" of no
value to the surplus country, unless the imbalances  could be carried forward by mutual agreement  for
future clearing settlement. A major concern of prudent  trade management  was thus avoiding the
accumulation  of an unplanned  surplus. Export quotas were the preferred instrument  to prevent
undesirable  surplus.  Countries  could, however, agree on medium-term  commodity  and long-term
investment  credits in the form of specified  temporary  surpluses and deficit positions in specific
subaccounts. Interest and principal  were normally  settled in the same way, and the agreements  were
built into future commodity  balances.
Balof  Pents.  The practice of setting up planned subbalances  and settling ex post through
clearing  made macroeconomic  management  of the balance  of payments  redundant  between CMEA7
countries. External balance  became  a microeconomic  task.  Furthermore, due to the absence  of
fungibility  across subbalances,  aggregate  bilateral  balances had no economic  meaning and could hide
large partial surpluses  and deficits that were not and could not be consolidated. The aggregate
balance  of a particular CMEA country  with the region as a whole was an even less meaningful
construct, as this could hide side-by-side  huge bilateral surpluses  and deficits that could not be cleared
multilaterally.
Exchange  Rates.  Since (1) trade flows were set in bilateral agreements  and managed  directly through
government authorities-or  FITOs  as their agents, (2) frms'  financial claims and obligations  from
CMEA trade were denominated  in domestic prices and currencies, (3) windfall gains and losses in the
accounts of FrOs were neutralized  through price equalization,  and (4) external  balance was not a
macroeconomic  management  tzsk, exchange rates served merely as a device for statistical  aggregation
across CMEA currencies.  As discussed above, however, there was a link between exchange  rates and
the aggregate fiscal balance.
IV.  MAJOR PRACTICAL  DEFECTS OF THE CMEA  REGIME
The CMEA system of rules and procedures, although  internally consistent,  exhibited  a number  of
endemic practical defects.
Rationale  for Integration. Three deficiencies  of the initial rationale  for the ('MEA became
increasingly  obvious. First, the traditional Marxist preoccupation  with dynamic effects, according  to
which comparative  advantage  is not "given"  to a country  but is rather 'made" through
"learning-by-doing"  and accumulating  know-how,  was not matched  by provisions  to ensure a
semblance  of static efficiency. Second, concerr.  for achieving  economies  of scale through agreements
on 'cooperation" was not balanced  by concern for maintaining  effective  competition. And third, as
detente  progressed, the concern for seurity  of supply lost its previous importance.
Assessments  of Gains from Trade.  Domestic  and CMEA pricing conventions  and the lack of a
meaningful  exchange  rate precluded any practicable  means of evaluating  domestic resources costs or
assessing  gains from trade.  Onle  consequence  was the inability  of governments  to judge whether  any
particular exchange of goods was econiomically  efficient. 11'  The arbitrary pricing rules suggest  that
a sizable portion of CMEA  trade must have been "inefficient,"  while opportunities  for efficient  trade
remain unrevealed. 12'
A related consequence  of the impossibility  of inferring whether  there were realized gains from
trade was the suspicion of all partner countries  that they were the losers from CMEA trade.  This
created  pervasive distrust about CMEA transactions. There is anecdotal  evidence  that for each
country at least some transactions during some periods gave rise to substantial "losses."  The
complaints  about losses from trade also gave rise to an extended  debate among  Western economists
about "implicit subsidies"  by the USSR to the CMEA Six, during the 1970s  and much  of the 1980s,
in the form of underpriced raw materials exchanged  for overpriced manufactures. Numerical
estimates  of the total implicit transfer  differ widely. However, Western analysts are in general
conivinced  that during this period the USSR was the main "loser" by a wide margin.)'  Supporting
evidence is provided by the fact that the Eastern  European Six - with the exception  of Romania -- did
not seem to have made a detennined effort to reduce  the share of CMEA in total trade, although  the
principles of trade planning starting from initial 'offers" and "inquiries"  provided scope for a
determined  strategy in this direction.Pmocedurs. A shortcoming  of the CMEA regime was the necessity  to resort to the cumbersome  and
inherently  inefficient  procedures  of clearing within  bilateral sdbbalances,  and to use export quotas as
the major instrument  of management. Procedural  complexities  rather than strategic  decisions  were the
main reason that CMEA trade remained  essentially  bilateral.
Trade compression  was a consequence  of the cumbersome  procedures. In order to maintain
bilateral balances  for specific subcategories  of goods, the obvious - if not the only - means  of
assuring effective trade planning  was to maintain  export volumes "at safe levels," that is, so low that
both trading partners felt reasonably  certain that they could avoid  unplanned  trade credits from
surpluses.
Commodity  specialization  of the FTOs was frequently  determined  in terms of export mix (serving
a diverse clientele's import requirements)  or by %he  import needs of the export-supplying  producers
(handling  a broad spectrum  of commodities  often paralleling  other FTOs).  In either case, the range
of goods tended to be more diffuse on the import side than on the export side, giving the FrOs a
predisposition  to focus their expertise, initiatives, and organization  on exports as primarv activity.
Tais created a systematic  bias against CMEA imports and resulted - due to the feedback  on trade
planning - in suppression  of some trade that might  have been feasible or desirable on the basis of
comparative  advantage  (Ausch 1969), side-by-side  with excessive  specialization.
Trade Paterns.  The practice of having trade handled by a few large FTOs, and excluding  thereby the
export-producing  and import-receiving  firms, had a number of undesirable  consequences  for the trade
structure. The generation  and exchange  of product information  was suppressed,  making CMEA trade
informationally  inefficient. It was unnecessary  and impossible  for producing  firms to develop  an
export marketing infrastructure. And guaranteed  exports underwritten  by bilateral treaties -
pronounced  in the case of specialization  agreements  - created monopolies  that, particularly when
combined  with sellers' market conditions,  gave export  producers no incentive  to be concernea with
product standards, delivery terms, and customer  satisfaction. The practice of trade planning  and of
detailed bilateral protocols also tended to restrict changes in the composition  of trade to incremental
adjusunent  of past negotiated  quantities  and prices, hence limiting  the advantage  via trade-expansion
opportunities  from product development.
Production  Structure. Access to low-cost imported raw materials and assured exports regardless  of
production costs were advantageous  in the short run: they shielded  domestic enterprises  from
exogenous  disturbances  and facilitated  consistently  high output levels and acceptable  financial results.
In the long run, however, structural change  was avoided. Continued  access  to cheap crude oil and
natural gas from the USSR  throughout  the 1970s  and into the 1980s  was the main cause of neglect  of
energy co  'Grvation. And the ease of disposing of manufacturing  output in the USSR meant that it
was not necessary  to upgrade output mix and process technologies  in line with world market
standards.  Production  activities were maintained  that were not viable in non-CMEA  trade relations.
Tle  separation  of the domestic  economy  from char'es  in world relav  ve prices and from technological
innovation  over time ossified the industrial  structu.,  making industries  increasingly  uncompetitive
outside bilateral CMEA agreements. As a consequence  of this lack of contact  with the world market,
enterprises were often almost exclusively  dependent  on CMEA  transactions.
Lnr&gtLU  S  imcW  . In the CMEA trading framework,  price incentives  to increase exports were
eliminated  via the practice of determining  trade flows ex ante in the intergovernmental  bilateral
protocols, and via the valuation  of traded goods in domestic prices after neutralizing  all "windfall"9
gains and losses through price equalization. Lack of financial rewards and assured export sales also
discouraged  product development.
EtflwE  Qfl.  Apart from a few homogenous  commodities  for which prices are publicly quoted,
the Bucharest  pricing principle  has been unworkable. This is particularly  so for manufactures,  where
products are rarely comparable,  reliable price information  is nonexistent,  and sheer numbers
overwhelm  any attempt  to apply the principle.)  The procedures amount  to an open invitation  to
resort to deceptive information  practices  and excessi e bargaining,  although  the price equalization
mechanism  compensates  enterprises  for "losses" in comparison  with domestic  prices, neutralizing  the
most effective watchdogs  for proper pricing.  More dysfunctional  practices  have reportedly occurred.
For example, prices were adjusted  retroactively  in order to correct ex post imbalances. Or
L"unrealistic" or othervwise  objectionable  prices for some deliveries were offset by price concessions
for other goods.  In dhe  absence  of price negotiations  between the directly affected  parties  - export
producers and import recipients  - the conception  of trade as havir.g  entailed "commercial"
transactions is suspect.
Even if international  prices could have been determined,  application  of the Bucharest  principle
may have been i. appropriate  on efficiency  grounds. World market prices reflect market power,
scarcity, and opportunity  cost at the degree of convertibility  and multilateralism prevailing  in the
broad market.  As long as the same conditions  did not apply inside  the CMEA, market clearing  prices
within the CMEA were quite different. World market prices, even if determined  ac.2urately,  were a
poor guide to CMEA's "opportunity  costs" as long as it was a "closed"  region.
Paments -System. The CMEA was not a "payment  union" since national  currencies were excluded
from  CMEA transactions  and the TR lacked key finctions of money  that would have made a genuine
instrument  of payment. The lack of currency and commodity  convertibility  restricted the payment
system even bilaterally. Settlement  of unplanned  credits in ex post imbalances  was difricult  or
impossible  in the short run and could not necessarily  be achieved  in the long run.
CQnvertibility. There was some convertibility  in three special cases:
First, under the rules of bilateral trade between  the USSR and Finland, Finnish exporters
could sell their export receipts (in r-bles) to the Finnish National  Bank at the official Soviet
exchange  rate (Oblath 1986). How:ver, the total amount for conversion  was tightly
controlled  on the Finnish side through txport licenses, which were established  via a planning
procedure that closely resembled  that used among  the CMEA countries. Under such
conditions, bilateral balance  was assured, and the settlements  amounted  to clearing in all but
name.J-'
Second, the USSR and Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia  permitted  firms with "direcc
links" (that is, cooperating  under long-term  contracts)  freely to convert funds from one
national  currency into the other at special "investment  exchange  rates."  This privilege  was
limited to transactions  specified in the contract.
Third, some CMEA countries  shifted  part.  of their CMEA trade from accounting  in TR to
accounting  in convertible  currency. However, this amounted  merely to a change of the unit
of account in bilateral clearing unless imbalances  could be settled through transfer of CC.
Even if this were part of the arrangement,  such transfers were often restricted to preagreed10
,swings."  Such pseudoconvertibility  made sense only if all deliveries  under this mode of
settlement were mutually  agreed to be  considered  'hard."
In none of these three cases was there convertibility  in the usual sense that this concept is
understood in the West in international  monetary transactions.
Exabange,  R=.  Exchange rates between national  currencies  and the TR had no apparent rational
basis.w  Ihere is evidence  that, at least for some countries,  exchange rates were computed  as the
ratio of total exports valued at domestic  prices to the value in TR for some base period, which makes
the exchange  rate a historical "purchasing  power parity" rate computed  for exports. Even so, such a
ratio would reflect centrally regulated  trade, and not market values  or comparative  costs.
Mismatches  of cross-rates  were prominent and a natural consequence  of the system.  As an
example, in the summer  of 1987,  the National  Bank of Hungary's exchange  rate for CC transactions
was 47 forint/$.  For CMEA trade, the commercial  rate was 28 forintlTR; in combination  with the
IBEC rite of 0.65 TR/$, the implicit  forint rate under the CMEA regime was only 18 forint/$.
Differences  in relative prices (overpricing  of Hungarian  manufacturing  exports and underpricing  of
Soviet raw materfAls)  and offsetting  price adjustments  elsewhere  reduce the discrepancy, but a
significant  difference  remains.l'
Macroplicis.  Centrally  planned economies  neither have nor need a macroeconomic  policy
framework  for managing  internal  and external  balance. Macrobalance  is maintained  through central
micromanagement  of all transactions. In addition, the principles  of the CMEA expressly excluded
any obligation  for international  coordination  or for cooperation  on other than microeconomic  matters
as specified  via bilateral treaties. Because  of limitations  on functions  (automatic  creation and
contraction  of aggregate  TR stocks through aggregate  temporary  imbalances  in the accounts  of IBEC;
the lack of currency reserves and fungibility),  the common  currency was unsuitable  for regional
monetary coordination  or management. Also, the CMEA view of fiscal policy as an instrument  for
financing  budgetary expenditures  made cross-country  coordination  less relevant  than when fiscal
policy is directed at internal  demand management.
Curreny JLinks. Trade under the CMEA regime and convertible  currency  trade were procedurally
separate. This separation  frequently invites misconception. On the assumption  that convertible
currency is 'more valuable"  than TR,LW  it would appear to be advantageous  to shift hard exportables
from the CMEA to CC markets. However, even if protocols  were to permit this, there is no
necessary  gain.  Under CMEA trading practices, an export reduction  tends to trigger a matching
export reduction by the trading partner, to avoid  export surpluses  and also as retaliation  against
breach of commitmert. This response, in turn, makes it necessary  for the initiating  country  to
counter the decline in CMEA imports  with additional  imports  from convertible-currency  sources,
which requires matching  export proceeds in CC.  The net result may or may not be beneficial  for the
initiating  country in terms of CC savings. The outcome depends  on the real exchange ratios for
products deleted  from CMEA exchange.
InM1r  In".  There is a related effect via imported inputs used in export production. Hungarian
data on the import content  of exports appeat3 in Table 4.  These estimates,  derived from input-output
data, reveal that Hungary transferred three times as much of convertible  currency incorporated  in
exports to CMEA countries as it received in return (25.6 percent vs. 8.5 percent).  While the
numbers are dated, there is no reason to assume drastic change  over time in Hungary's case or11
differences in principle in other CMEA  countries. Trade agreements  could take account of such
export-embodied  currency arbitrage through special arrangements  for exports with a high CC content,
by supply in kind by the export-recipient  country  or by direct reimbursement  for CC outlays. In
many instances.  however, this was not feasible;  there were consequently  proposals  to idle CMEA
export capacity  if CMEA exports of a good constituted  a net drain on the convertible  currency
balance (see Koeves 1985).
-fable 4.  Hungary: Imported Input Content of Export (1974)
TR Regime  CC Regime
TR Regife  11.2  8.5
Inpus  inedW  fn)m:....  ..
CC Regifme  25.6  21.5
Source:  Pecsi (1981).
V.  EVALUATION
As the preceding analysis  has shown, the traditional  CMEA regime was no random accumulation  of
ad hoc rules.  It exhibited  a great deal of internal logic, although  it was not derived from a
comprehensive  theoretical  blueprint. It evolved heuristically  over several decades  of bureaucratic
trial-and-error. As a result, the institutions  of the traditional  CMEA regime were fundamentally
consistent  in several directions. First, its rules were compatible  with one another.  Second,
systematic  interdependencies  were internalized,  that is, the principles and rules of the regime were
consistent  with the model of traditional central  planning  from which the CMEA regime was derived,
and within  which it initially  operated, and, to a somewhat  lesser extent, were consistent  even with the
"modified' version of central  planning. But frictions started to emerge once the interdependent
framework  of central planning was compromised  through partial  reforms of other systemic  rules.
And third, in order to conduct mutual trade, the member countries  adopted matching  - essentially
identical  - rules and procedures  for CMEA trade planning, implementation,  and settlement.
Conversely,  unilateral changes  out of step with other countries would create frictions. These, in turn,
resulted in a need to introduce  corrective measures,  thereby leading  to further frictions and
inconsistencies. The CMEA regime, in short, was in a powerful  way self-perpetuating  for systemic
reasons alone.  In the 1980s,  however, these consistency  properties increasingly  became  shackles  to
reforns.
Due to its consistency,  the CMEA regime was effective  in handling  a large volume of trade
without breakdowns  or excessive  cyclical disruptions. But in addition  to stifling system reform, it
exhibited  two other defects that became  even more obvious.
First, the need to resort to complex  procedures  to make model principles operational,  along with
built-in incentives  to maintain  the bill of traded goods  set in intergovernment  protocols, eliminated
virtually  all short-run flexibility, and subjected  medium-run  changes  to cumbersome  bilateral
negotiations.
Second, the CMEA model  did not contain any provisions  that would ensure an efficient pattern of
trade.  The principal  reason for this defect was that the model did not reveal static gains from trade,12
let alone establish  a feedback  between  gains and economic  decisions.  The most obvious inefficiency  of
mutual trade - the disadvantaged  position  of the USSR derived from its specialization  in exports of
hard raw materials and imports  of soft manufactures,  with biased price formation  practices  - became
inc*reasingly  evident.
For the Six, this pattern implied  a short-term  advantage  and served as an incentive  to retain and
strengthen  underlying  production structures,  regardless  of changes in trade patterns and relative  prices
in competitive  markets. Furthermore,  the monopolistic  domestic and regional sellers' market
removed all incentives  for producers to keep up with international  standards of product and process
technology  and to develop effective  marketing  know-how  and infrastructures  outside  the CMEA.
These mutually  reinforcing, cumulative  effects  became  evident in a secular decline of exports to
competitive  markets and a down-market  shift of export  mix.  (rable 5 illustrates  the long-term loss of
world market shares and of international  competitiveness.)  Thus, with several decades of symbiotic
relations within the CMEA and with the sheer weight  of intraregional  transactions,  a pervasive
"structural  dependency"  developed  between  the member  countries. Even so, the degree of
dependency  varies.  The USSR can divert a large share of exports of raw materials  to CC markets
(either in the West or for convertible  currency payment  by former CMEA countries) in the short run;
the obverse is not the case, since the results of structural, technological,  and marketing  defects can be
corrected  only in a complex  process of modernization  and learning extending  over an unknown  length
of time.
Table 5.  World Export Shares
(Percentage)
1970  1980  1987
-.  trn  Eonan  Sig
Share in world expolts, total trade  6.8  4.5  4.7
Share in world exports, engineering products  0.79  0.7  0.43
Shane in world exports,  high and advanced  0.25  0.14  0.11
technology engineering products
Share of high and advanced technology  31.3  26.8  25.9
prduct  in engineering exports
A*in NICs: (Komea.  TAiwan.  Sinnano-re.  Hong
Shar  in world exports, engineering products  1.0  3.9  6.3
Shane in world expors,  high and advanced  0.49  1.73  3.21
technology engineering products
Shame  in world exports, technology in  50.8  44.5  50.9
engineering expors  products
Source: ggg  Economic Survey of Europe in 1989-1990, New York (1989).13
VI.  THE END OF THE CMEA
By 1987, proponents  of system reform saw the traditional CMEA regime as fraught with rigidities
and inefficiencies  and as a serious obstacle to progress. The 1987 session  of the Council  of Ministers
passed a resolution  auvocating  transformatior,  of the CMEA from the old concept  of  'plan
coordination"  to a "market" framework. The 1988 Council  Session  discussed a new "collective
concept' for the creation of a "unified  market."  Its main objective, set out by the chairman,  was:
...  to overhaul  the integratior mechanism  and to construct  a qualitatively  new model of
intracommunity  cooperation  centered  on the creation  of a single market of the CMEA member
countries, complete  with free movement  of goods, services, and other factors of production.
The need of such a market stems objectively  from the logic of economic  reforms in the
individual  socialist countries, which are centered  on the promotion  of commodity-money  (i.e.,
market) relations.LW
However, halfhearted  discussions  about fundamental  reform of the CMEA regime or of the
modalities  of a new regional market concept remained  academic.  No further official move was made
until the 45th Council Session met in Sofia in January 1990.'  Even during that decisive meeting,
there was no tangible  progress toward fundamental  reform of the CMEA. The USSR announced  its
decision to switch, by January 1991, to an undefined  framework  of CC accounting  and to some form
of convertibility  among members, abrogatirng  the traditional  mode of operation.2'  In the absence  of
serious efforts to salvage  elements  of the legally still existent CMEA regime, it became generally
accepted  that the CMEA would vanish, unceremoniously,  by January 1, 1991.
A successor  organization  - referred to as the "Organization  for International  Economic
Cooperation"  (OIEC) - may be created during 1991. Its draft statutes reportedly limit its mandate  to
"consultation  and advisory functions"  and permit "open" membership,  that is, joining the the OIEC
and other regional  organizations  would not be mutually  exclusive. In addition to former members  of
the CMEA, Yugoslavia  and the extended  Federal Republic  of Germany  (as the successor of the GDR)
may be invited to join.
The process of defining  feasible and reasonably  efficient  transition arrangements  (see the final
section below) has spurned proposals for innovative  institutional  solutions superseding  the CMEA.
The most widely discussed  one is the creation  of a "Central European Payment Union" (CEPU),
patterned  roughly on the European  Payment Union (EPU) of the 195Os.  The basic idea is to pool
members' scarce currency reserves - the chief constraint  to full marketization  of trade including  a
shift to currency convertibility  - and to economize  on use by maximal clearing  within the union. The
USSR, as the structural creditor within  the group, would have to receive settlement  of its aggregate
surplus in fungible  convertible  currency under terms at least as favorable as the gain from switching
to CC trade on its own. Such an arrangement,  to operate effectively, would require (1) a common
agency with considerable  power to set rules, control adherence,  and impose  conditions, and (2)
creation of an initial pool of convertible  currency from contributions  of members and/or others.
Since there is a lack of wide political backing  for either condition  among the affected  countries -
mainly due to limited mutual trust, a CMEA legacy  - the window  of opportunity  for this option
seems to have closed.14
Vll. TRANSMTION  TO A POST-CMEA  WORLD
In addition to the combined  shocks of stabilization  policy, repercussions  of the Gulf crisis, and the
collapse of trade with the former GDR, the East European countries  (the 'Five'  since dissolution  of
East Germany)  face a major shock from the dismantling  of the CMEA system of trade and payments.
The CMEA adjustment  shock has, in turn, two components: terms-of-trade  adjustment  and the
downward  adjustment  of trade flows.
Terlmsof-Trade  Adiustments. The termination  of the CMEA  should result in the correction of the
historically  distorted price ratio between raw materials  and manufactures  discussed  earlier.  As the
Five are heavily dependent  on energy imports, and have averaged  more than 80 percent of their
energy imports from the USSR, these imports  are normally considered  the major factor in the
distortion. For crude oil (indicative  also for prices of oil derivatives,  gas, electricity, and coal), the
numbers below illustrate  the situation:
Table 6.  Crude Oil Prices, 1988-90
(Arabian  light, in $/b)
1988  1989  1990  1991
July  August  Total (est.)
Year average  13.7  16.3  14.8  25.8  23.2  --
Preceding  five  year  19.8  17.5  - - 16.9  16.8
avenge
Source: World  Bank.
Under CMEA's pricing rule, the reference  price would drop below the spot world market level
only during the second half of 1990, in the wake of the Gulf crisis.  This suggests  that the oil pricing
formula has not been the prime cause of Soviet  terms-of-trade  losses. Conversely, if manufactured
exports of the Five to the USSR in exchange  for crude oil had long been priced at world market
levels, the USSR would not have had terms-of-trade  losses  prior to the Gulf crisis but, rather, a
moderate  gain.  The primary cause  of losses must therefore have been the excessively  high price level
for manufactures.P-'  A forthcoming  study of the OECD estimates  the terms-of-trade  effects for the
1980s  as shown in Table 7.
Up to 1989, the numbers represent realized  terms-of-trade  gains of the Five vis-a-vis the USSR.
For 1990, however, the numbers indicate  the gains that would occur if delivery volumes of 1989
would remain unchanged. But since deliveries  declined  in 1990, while in the second half of the year
Soviet oil shipments  to CMEA countries  were increasingly  billed in actual CC prices, the balance  of
payment losses of the Five from abrogation  of the CMEA rules would be substantially  lower than the
elimination  of the "implicit  subsidies," shown above, suggests. Even more elusive would be an
extrapolation  to 1991, due to expected  further contraction  of CMEA  trade and particularly  of crude
oil deliveries  by the USSR.  Nevertheless,  the orders of magnitude  leave little doubt that the
combined  effect of dissolving  the CMEA  regime and higher crude oil prices will be a major shock for
the Five.;15
Adjustment  of Trade Flows.  Soviet energy exports are the residual  of domestic  production and
consumption,  equivalent  to around 20 percent of production  in 1989. As production is dropping and
domestic consumption  stagnating,  the size of this residual has declined  substantially  since 1988 (by 5
percent for the first nine months of 1990  compared to the same period in 1989; by another 10 percent
for 1991). In 1990, the USSR changed  its allocation  policy in anticipation  of the new CMEA rules
and in response to its own balance  of payment  problems. Earlier, volumes  of deliveries  to the Five
were kept stable and adjustment  was made in convertible  currency exports.  In early 1990, however,
the USSR reversed  the priority.  Deliveries  to the Five started to drop sharply and the year as a
whole may average 15-25  percent below 1989  levels.Z' Informal estimates  for 1991 indicate a
further decline, perhaps to one-third  of the 1989 levels.
Table 7.  Estimates of ImpDldt  Soviet SubsldiesL'
(in billions of current US$)
1962  1987  1968  i9  1990
(a)  (b)  (c)  Percent of
GDP
Hungary  2.6  0.1  .0.1  1.0  1.1  1.9  2.6  3.4
Bulgaria  3.7  0.2  -0.1  1.4  1.6  2.7  3.7  7.1 (1989)
Czechoslovakda  4.9  0.2  -0.2  1.8  2.1  3.5  4.9  7.0 (1989)
GDR  5.9  0.3  40.2  2.2  2.5  4.2  5.9  n.a.
Poland  4.3  0.2  -0.2  1.6  1.8  3.1  4.3  5.0
Romania  0.4  0  0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  n.a.
CMEA  SmX  21.7  1.0  -0.9  8.1  9.4  15.6  21.8  n.a.
Five (ex. GDR)  15.9  0.8  -1.1  5.8  6.8  11.4  15.9  n.a
(a)  based on oil price of $15.8/barrel
(b)  based on oil price of ($15.8+$26.0)/2 =  $20.9/barrel
(c)  based on oil price of $26.0/barrel
Source: Michael  Marrese, OECD, forthcoming;  GDP: World Bank  estimates.
As a result of the terms-of-trade  adjustment  and reduced  Soviet crude oil exports, the volume and
value of intra-CMEA  trade are expected  to fall.  A second volume effect is likely in manufactured
exports to the USSR. The USSR  could use the convertible  currency receipts from raw materials
exports left after its debt service payments  to switch to imports  of higher quality and/or lower prices
by buying from CC countries. Since the available  export supply of the Five can arguably  not be
diverted easily to other markets, a sizable share of their exports would collapse. Alternatively,  the
USSR could demand  delivery of fully competitive  manufactures  as a condition  for continued  supply of
fuels and other crucial  raw materials. In this case, the Five would have to divert some of their
exportables  from OECD markets to the USSR, thus reducing  their own capacity to maintain  import
from convertible  currency markets. In this case some present trade of the Five with OECD markets
would be destroyed. 2 2'  The USSR, in contrast, is likely to be a net gainer in either case: the
income effect of improved  terms with CMEA countries  and  increased  convertible  currency revenues16
will expand its trade and improve its capacity to import "hard" goods from the most suitable sources.
Estimates  suggest that the balance  will be heavily on the side of destruction  of intraregional  trade.
For 1990  the volume of Soviet  exports to the Five is expected  to average 10-15  percent less, and of
imports  some 8-10 percent less.  For 1991 informal  Soviet estimates  suggest a volume of trade with
the Five at around 50-60 percent of the 1989  level.  The resulting contraction  of total exports of the
Five feeds back on the level of output through multiplier effects  of unknown  strength, amplifying  the
contraction  from the stabilization  program.
The Limits of Short-Run  Adjustment. As mentioned,  an important  determinant  of the approach  to
trade regime reform and of the closely connected  issue of currency convertibility  is the level of
currency reserves.-M  For this reason the decision  to use the exchange  rate as an anchor for price
stabilization  was feasible for Poland and Yugoslavia  but may not be for, say, Bulgaria, Romania, or
the USSR. There is no rigorous yardstick for what constitutes  sufficient  reserves - for instance,
sufficient  to defend the anchor rate until inflationary  momentum  has been halted.  Alternatively,
countries  could switch  to floating rates with market clearing  levels. But without  the reserves for some
degree of management  of the market rates, the inflationary  and budgetary repercussions  could be
highly destabilizing. In market economies,  an often invoked  rule-of-thumb  is that for a country  of
high performance  rating, reserves should be no lower than two months' supply of imports; for
countries  of lower standing  the reserves should cover az least four months. Applying even these
rather vague rules to the transition of East European  countries  runs into formidable  statistical and
conceptual  problems.-;
A critical factor in connection  with the above discussion  of the CMEA adjustment  shock is
"export responsiveness,"  a composite  of several factors beyond "price elasticity  of supply" in the
common  definition. First, even in this narrow behavioral  sense, and even if firms can be made to
respond normally to profit incentives,  sustainable  responsiveness  is constrained  on the downside by a
"reservation  price" (for example,  prime cost of production). Second, the lingering legacy of
structural dependency  under the CMEA  regime is likely to hamper effective  competitiveness  until
firms have caught up technologically  and in marketing. And third, more than just supply-side
responses  are involved in imperfect  markets where buyers respond  primarily  to the specifications  of
the product and the standard  of associated  services rather than to prices  - that is, for most high value
manufactures. In sum, "getting  the prices right," while clearly a necessary  condition  for inducing a
positive response to the dissolution  of the CMEA  through appropriate  trade diversion and expansion,
is not likely to be sufficient  beyond a narrow range of transactions.
Many analysts  are pessimists  about quick and sustainable  positive results from trade reform, on
the basis of arguments  sketched  above.3' To them, the collapse of East Germany's industry -- due
to the lack of competitive  output and of the capacity  to sell at a price reflecting resource costs -
seems to offer a particularly  telling story about the pervasive  short-term  constraints created  by
structural dependency. Other analysts  take an optimistic  stance.A' Only three countries -- Poland,
Yugoslavia,  and Hungary  - could at this point be regarded as possible test cases.  The volume of
their convertible  currency exports is expected  in 1990  to inc -ase by 34 percent, 12 percent, and 10
percent, respectively. While extreme  export pessimism  seems to be refuted by these early
observations,  the period under new trading rules is too short and the evidence  too soft to determine
whether this is the beginning  of a trend or merely a statistical  blip.
T_sitioal  Arrangements  Among  CMEA Countries. The pronounced  principles  of CMEA relations
after  -January 1, 1991 are (1) accounting  in convertible  currency, and (2) use of actual world market17
prices. It is less clear, however, what these principles amount  to in the real world.  As past practices
have shown, 'accounting in convertible  currency' can range from a mere change  of unit of currency
denomination  for unchanged  bilateral clearing  to a transition  to full currency convertibility. And the
meaning  of the "shift to world market prices" can range from a change  of procedures of
administrative  price setting to complete  devolution  of price decisions  to informed  traders.  Only
implementing  the principles will reveal their real content.
An instantaneous  transition to free trade rules would be optimal  on theoretical  grounds.  Given
the pervasive  structural dependency  syndrome, however, a quick, radical solution  may not be feasible,
for it is likely to lead to a rapid collapse  of exports to the USSR without  synchronized  expansion  of
exports to alternative  markets. Apart from negative  impact  on output and employment,  this would
lead to sharp reduction  of the capacity  to import. Furthermore, a radical shift in trade patterns may
not be best, because the resource endowments  of the Five and USSR do complement  each other and
their energy transport infrastructure  already exists.  Finally, geographic  and cultural proximity and
technical standards give the Five a competitive  advantage  against newcomers  in the Soviet market.
This is in in sharp contrast  to the Five's difficulties  in gaining  or expanding  a share in Western
markets.  As a result, a "transition  period" is widely  thought  to be desirable.
The year 1991  is frequently  referred to as the first year of the "transition  period" to full
multilateral  convertibility  and unconstrained  trade. Yet no definite  commitments  are reported
regarding the features and length  of the transition period. All subsequent  observations  are thus mere
inferences  from scattered  and unofficial  evidence. Nevertheless,  the shared perception  of CMEA's
defects supports  this proposition:  it is in the Soviet  interest to keep the transition period short, while
the Five have an interest in an extended  transition, to cope with their more severe adjustment  shock.
An important  implication  is that the transition regime will probably  cover exclusively  bilateral
relations between  the USSR and each of the Five.  A likely complication  for such bilateral
arrangements  is the unclear division  of competence  for trade and payments  between the Union and the
republics  of the USSR.  For the limited  trade among  the Five, an immediate  switch-over  to
OECD-type  trading rules may be likely.
From what is presently  known, the emergence  of two distinct sets of rules seems most probable.
The first regime is frequently  referred to as the domain  of "indicative  lists"; in the aggregate  it is
expected  to amount  to roughly one-third  of the value of 1990  transactions  between the USSR  and the
Five. It will consist of commodities  specified  in advance in bilateral agreements  but will leave to
firms the determination  of quantities  and prices.  Some Soviet  raw material exports will probably  be
covered by this regime in exchange for "priority" food products and manufactures  of acceptable
quality. The second regime will consist of transactions  carried out under the same rules as CC trade.
The size and coverage  of each of the two regimes will be negotiated  bilaterally  and may initially
differ substantially  from country  to country.M/
Important features  of the first regime will be the overall balancing  framework, the mechanism  of
settlement,  and the features of currency convertibility. From what is known, there are likely to be
line-of-credit  provisions  and agreements  on settlement  of bilateral imbalances  through transfer of CC
within agreed limits.  Thus, while currency convertibility  may be restricted,  the scope tor bilateral
commodity  convertibility  will be greatly extended. The regime will require minimal  reserves of CC.18
The evolution of transition regimes is at this juncture even more elusive.  Present thinking  seems
to be that commodity  coverage will progressively  shift from the first to the second regime until at
some point full trade liberalization  and full currency convertibility  has been reached.  Like the initial
scope of the two regimes, the path and pace of transition may be different between different pairs of
countries. Obvious factors relevant in this context are commitments  from existing long-term
specialization  agreements  and the availability  of sufficient  currency reserves on both sides.19
ENDNOTES
1.  This paper is a revised  and e-tended version of the earlier paper, "The CMEA System of Trade and
Payments: Today and Tomorrow" (1990).
2.  CMEA trade and payment agreemenu could in principle be multilateral.  But the difficulty of
negotiating  multilateral  agreements  wit>,  the degree of specificity  dictated  by the CMEA procedures
of contracting and settlement makes them an exception  in practice.  The references to "bilateral"
throughout  this paper refer to this de facto rather than legal restriction  to bilateralism.
3.  Data on intra-CMEA  trade are inherently  weak.  Primary data are largely based on idiosyncratic
pricing and exchange  rate conventions  that differ from country to country  and over time, and they
are normally "adjusted" in secondary sources by methods that are not always well-documented.
Thus, national  trade aggregates over both trade regimes and all indicators based on aggregates  are
merely  indicative for  orders  of  magnitude, and  the scope for  intercountry or  intertemporal
comparisons is severely limited.  Specifically,  overevaluation  of the TR tends to exaggerate  the
CMEA shares.
4.  "Ruble trade" is merely an approximation  of CMEA trade; some CMEA trade transactions are
denominated  and cleared bilaterally in CC (and, thus, are only superficially  different from ruble
trade), and a small percentage are denominated and actually "paid'  in CC through transfer of
fungible funds.  On the other hand most trade with other socialist countries and some LDCs is
denominated  and cleared  bilaterally  in CC.
5.  As will be evident at the end of this section, the CMEA regime is not, as often thought, a random
collection of  "irrational" practices.  It rather exhibits a great deal of internal logic and overall
consistency, although its  logic  is  different from  that underlying the  conventional theory of
international  trade, and corresponds to the model of central planning from which it is derived.
6.  Barter trade is, with the exception  of a few large cooperative  deals, not  feasible for inform-s-onal
reasons.  Under a pure barter arrangement,  the number of specific commodity  exchange rat5os  is n
[n - 11/2,  where n is the number  of commodities. For n= 100, the number of ratios is 4,950.  For
any realistic number  of commodities,  and extending  the same pattern to every pair of countries,  the
number of ratios quickly  approaches  infinity (McKinnon  1979).
7.  According  to an alternative  definition, 'hard" goods are those for which a shortage exists within  the
CMEA, and "soft" are those in surplus within the CMEA. Both definitions  yield largely identical
results but there can be notable differences.  For example, most agricultural  products are "hard'
according to the second definition  but "soft" according to the first because of inability to access
alternative  markets.
8.  Probably  for no other element  of the model  is the difference  between  principle  and practice as wide
as that regarding  relative priorities. The preferred practical response  to such shortages  was, at least
through the 1980s, to default in bilateral  agreements  as long as reealiation  in the form of withholding
deliveries from the other side did not create prohibitive  costs.  Penalties  for violations of protocols
or contracts were often difficult  to enforce.20
9.  Price equalization  is used here as a generic term.  The actual arrangement  could work in a variety
of ways, for instance, through the use of foreign trade 'multipliers'  or through 'coefficients' in
actual  accounting,  or through procedures  that seemingly  amount  to a multiple  exchange  rate system.
In each case, the purpose and effect are essentially  the same as discussed  above. An example  of the
actual outcome is the Hungarian 'producers' turnover  tax," discussed in endnote 16.
10. This commonly overlooked fiscal role of the exchange rate through the mechanism of price
equalization  is analyzed  in the Annex. In stark simplification,  three cases can be distinguished:
(1) If the external transactions are in balance  both in TR and in domestic currency, then the net
balance  of price equalization  is zero regardless  of the exchange  rate; (2) If the external  transactions
are in balance in TR prices (i.e., if the rules of bilateral clearing are strictly adhered  to) but not in
domestic currency, then the aggregate  net balance of price equalization  has a specific (positive  or
negative)  value, reflecting  the sign of the aggregate  domestic imbalance,  regardless  of the exchange
rate; and (3) If external  transactions  in TR prices are not in balance (i.e., if either a credit is involved
or if trade planning/management  misses  the balancing  target), then exchange  rate adjustment  changes
the (positive or negative) net balance, but not the TR imbalance. In either of the last two cases,
changes in domestic prices of traded goods affect directly the size of the aggregate equalization
balance entering the budget.
11. Evaluation  coefficients  were reportedly  used in some countries  for this purpose. Most popular  was
the ratio of domestic currency units earned or  spent per  TR for a specific transaction.  This
coefficient is not, however, a measure of domestic resource cost, given pricing and exchange rate
practices.  Moreover, since the exchange rate between national currencies and the TR (which
theoretically sets the dividing line between "efficient" and "inefficient' transactions) is in some
instances  reportedly  a past ratio of currency  valuation  of all export tcansactions  for a previous  period,
i.e., the weighted  average of all specific transactions,  the analysis  would be circular.
12. As discussed  below, even if world market  prices were precisely  known  and product  differences  could
be ignored, the Bucharest  principle is still logically  flawed, since these external prices differ from
the opportunity  cost within the CMEA.
13. "The issues of  economic leverage, exploitation, and subsidies were very  troublesome in the
Soviet-East  European  relationship. The East Europeans  uniformly  felt held back and constrained  by
the ties with Moscow, and the Soviets  considered  the East Europeans  as ungrateful. In every  crisis,
these issues  came quickly to the surface, along  with charges and counter charges.." (Dawisha  1988,
p. 90).  According  to the same source, the aggregate  implicit transfers from the Six to the USSR
were around $14 billion (at the official exchange rate) for the period 1945-53, comparable  with
Marshall  Plan deliveries  to Western  Europe. Estimates  of transfers in the opposite  direction, which
combine  the effects of biased prices and the overvaluation  of the TR, range as high as $80 billion
for the period 1971-80  (p.  88).  There is evidence  of continuing "subsidies"  in Soviet oil deliveries
- in spite of drastically  lowered  $-reference  prices  - due to the overvaluation  of the TR.  In addition
to these "hidden" subsidies, the USSR accumulated  an aggregate  trade surplus with the Six in the
order of $50 billion between 1971  and 1986  (Machowski 1988, p. 440); a substantial  portion was
not part of formal credit arrangements  and hence for all practical purposes uncollectible.
14. For example, CMEA cooperation in production and trade of ball bearings reportedly recognized
some 50,000 distinct specifications. This lack of reasonably  detailed  and reliable information  makes
past claims  of some CMEA  countries  to have  based domestic  prices on "world  market  prices" utterly21
implausible,  and the notion  of an administrative  price reform on such basis highly suspect.
15. Presumably  similar arrangements  were in force for Finnish  trade with other CMEA  countries. `1'Tis
solution supports a key contention  of this paper: CMEA trade requires compatible rules on both
sides, even if these are alien to the internal  system.
16. 'The exact guidelines  underlying  the determination  of exchange  rates in CPEs are qui.e obscure and
sources differ on their rationale" (van Brabant 1987,  p. 201). Van Brabant  (1985), and Wolf (1988),
among  others, give an introduction  into  the dizzying array of exchange  rate concepts  used in practice
or for analytical  purposes; evidently  there is a good deal of confusion  among  Eastern economists  as
well. The concept of "exchange  rate," thus, is very "soft" throughout  this paper, and in the context
of the CMEA in general.
17. PlanEcon Report Vol. V, No. 32-33, p.2 arrives at a numerically  compatible  evaluation: "[Using]
... typical  operational  commercial cross-exchange  rates in countries  with fairly realistic commercial
exchange  rate (Hungary and Poland) [the cross-rate]  was only  $0.48/Ruble, or less than one-third
of the official rate" of 1.53 $/R.  The overvaluation  of the TR implied  in the comparison  of the main
text (47/18 = 2.61) is in the same order of magnitude. The reference  to "fairly realistic" seems to
imply that PlanEcon considers the imputed rate between $ and Ruble a reasonable estimate of a
"realistic"  rate. In the same context, and relating  to Soviet  oil exports  to the Six, PlanEcon  observes:
"No wonder the East Europeans have refused to  walk away from this  'nominally overpriced'
bargain." The Hungarian  "differential  producers' turnover  tax" also reflects  the gain  from unrealisti'
exchange  rates, and at the same  time illustrates  the roundabout  way in which the institution  of price
equalization  can work in practice.  In order to prevent Hungarian  importers of SovieX  crude from
cnjoying a "windfall," a special tax is levied that captures  the difference  of the actual import value
(zomputed according to CMEA rules) and the price of competing  crude oil from CC markets and
paid at the official exchange  rate applicable  for CC transactions. The very fact of this tax supports
again the presumption  of continued  subsidies  transmitted  through the CMEA  exchange  rate rules and
disproves the validity of the claim that crude oil from the USSR is "overpriced."
18. Convertible currency appears to be  more valuable berause of the "overvaluation"  of  the TR.
However, under the rules of the CMEA regime the exchange  rate between  domestic currency and
the TR is all but irrelevant  as a policy variable. More important  is the fact that export proceeds  in
convertible currency are, in contrast to those in TR, fully convertible.  This fungibility  permits
convertible  currency proceeds  to be allocated  to imports  that yield the highest economic  return.
19. Georgi Atanasov, Chairman of the Council  of Ministers, during the 44th CMEA Council Session,
Prague, July 6, 1988. FBIS-EEU-88-130,  July 7, 1988, p. 15.
20.  It is unclear whether  the ideas  and concepts  being floated for a "reformed  CMEA"  for an efficient
regional integration in the mirror image of the EC in Western Europe, as it were - added up to a
workable model. They have became irrelevant  in the wake of political changes  during 1989-90.
21.  An agreement in principle on these changes had already been reached between the USSR and
Hungary in late 1988, and discussions  on similar changes  had taken place between  the USSR and
Poland.
22.  More elaborate expositions  are presented, for instance, in ECE (1989) and van Brabant (1990).22
23.  This conclusion rests on the assumption that such terms-of-trade losses did indeed occur. This iS now
generally accepted  within CMEA countries  and among  the majority  of Western observers.
24. Official Hungarian  estimates  suggest a deterioration  of the terms of trade with the CMEA of about
30 percent by  '991.  The resulting balance of payment losses due to the CMEA transition are
estimated  to be in the order of $600-700  million  for 1991  at pre-Gulf prices, compared to a balance
of payments deficit  of $150-200  million  for 1990. Any increase  of the price per barrel of $1 would
translate into an additional  loss of $80-100  million.
25. Sizable repayments in kind (crude oil) from Iraq to the USSR for past credits, which were in part
to be rerouted to other CMEA countries, aggravated  the shortfall.
26.  Alternative  estimates  for 1989-90  - all estimates  involve  unknown  margins  of error due to the need
to resort to short-cut  methods  - arrive at numbers of similar orders of magnitude.
27. The size and pattern of  actual adjustment will depend upon the specifics of  the "transition'
arrangements  between each of the Five and the USSR, discussed at the end of this section.
28. The proposed Central European Payment Union, mentioned in the last section, is designed as a
multilateral  solution  to this very problem.
29. On the purely statistical level, there is no consensus  whether imports from the CMEA should be
included  or not. More substantive  are the conceptual  issues. For instance:  reported official  reserves
may be supplemented  by large unused  external stand-by  commitments  and lines of credit and can be
backed further by understandings  regarding arrears of debt-servicing  obligations. These additional
resources ultimately determine whether the level of  reported official reserves is  "sufficient."
Furthermore,  the reserve  cushion necessary  for an economy  facing  unresolved  systemic  issues  seems
much larger than for an economy  that needs only fine-tuning  of existing policies with predictable
responses.
30. The most thorough work in this area has probably been carried out by the ECE. In its 1989 report
it presents statistical  evidence  that the East European  countries' exports  of manufactures  have a high
and rising degree of 'market similarity" with the "southern  tier" countries  of the EC as well as a
high and rising degree of "product  similarity' (the same can probably  be presumed for the NICs),
and concludes  that the static effects  of European  integration  have been  negative  by 1986, particularly
for textiles and machinery,  the two most Important  export categories.  See ECE, Economic  Survey
for Europe in 1988-1989,  sY  1990; Chapter 2.5 (pp. 64-86).
31. J. Sach (1991), for instance, considers the emphasis  of the unknown  time dimension  of adjustment
of export "a rehash of the discarded structuralist doctrines, once so ruinously applied to Latin
America."
32. Initially a separate category of "mutually  balanced"  trade was considered  with both quantities  and
price set  in advance through bilateral negotiations, and with the "indicative list"  restricted to
deliveries of somewhat  lower priority.23
Am=ex
Price Equalization
Computation of Total Net Price Equalization
Net Price Equalization:
(1)  NPE  - XPE  +  MPE
(XPE: Export price equalization;  MPE:  Import price equalization)
(2)  XPE  =  E (qXi + pXi' * r) - E (qXi * pXi)
(for eXport item i: qXi: quantity;  pXi'; TR price; pXi:
domestic price r: exchange  rate)
(3)  MPE  - E (qMi * pMi) - E (qMi * pMi' * r)
(for iMport item i:  qMi; quantity;  pMi: dom price; pMi': TR price
(4)  NPE =  r * E[(qXi * pXi')  - E(qMi *  pMi')]
- E[A(qXi * pXi)  - E(qMi * pMi)]
(5)  NPE  =  r *  TB'  - TB
(TB':  Trade balance in TR; TB:  Trade Balance  in domestic  currency)
Interpretation
If the two systems  of relative prices pXl',  pMi'; and pXi, pMi were identical,  then TR' and
TR would differ by the same factor as the relative prices, i.e., by r, and PEF is always zero.
As stated in the main paper, the relative price systems are NOT equal, and one has to
consider  several cases:
Case  1: if TB'  = O and TB = O,
Then NPE is automatically  zero, regardless  of the exchange rate;
Case  2:  if TB'  = O and TB =/= O,
then NPE has a definitive  fixed value, regardless  of the exchange rate; the value of NPE is
equal  TB;24  nce CMEA  System  of Trde and  Payments
Case 3:  if TB'=/=  0 and TB = 0,
then the size and sign of NPE can be positive  or negative  depending  upon both the size and
sign of TB', and the exchange  rate;
Case  4:  if TB'  =/=  0 and TB =/=  0,
then the size and sign of NPE can be positive  or negative  depending  upon both the size and
sign of TB', TB, and the exchange  rate.
Conclusions
As TB' and TB can be equal only by accident, Case (1) can be ignored. Similarly, as TB =
0 would require a calibration  of the whole domestic price system, while it does not (have?) a major
economic  significance,  it can be expected  to occur only by accident; Cases (1) and (3) can therefore
be ignored. Case (2) describes  the outcome in the case of perfect match and relization of balanced
trade plans; and in this case the exchange  rate is irrelevant. Case (4) is the most likely real case of
either planned imbalances  of CMEA trade or accidental  imbalances  resulting from deviations between
cx ante and ex post quantity and/or price assumptions. In this instance a change of the exchange rate
mlone,  while not establishing  balance, chantes the size and can change  the sign of NPE.  However,
since it is consolidated  with the budget, the only effect of exchange rate is fiscal.  Nevertheless,  as a
serious domestic  price distortion, for instance a substantive  under-pricing  of some important  import
categories, do affect NPE, a supplementary  adjustment  of domestic prices can contribute  to correct a
highly negative  result for NPE; reportedly this is what happened  in Poland in the early 1980s  when
domestic food prices were by large margins  below international  prices.
In all cases any change of r changes  ALL payments  made to or received  from producers of
exports and consumers  of imports.25
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